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Empirical studies of central bank independence and inflation
identify Japan as an outlier. By standard measures, the Bank of
Japan is one of the least independent central banks in the
world, and yet Japan enjoys some of the lowest inflation rates.
This paper develops a model of monetary linkages with impli-
cations for the institutional commitment to price stability. The
model explains why price stability in the “old” Japan—with its
powerful bureaucracy and single-party rule—did not necessar-
ily rely on monetary institutions. It predicts that the “new”
Japan, in which power is shifting from the bureaucracy to
elected politicians who compete with each other in the political
marketplace, must make use of monetary institutions to achieve
price stability.
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MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/DECEMBER 1997I. Central Bank Independence and Inflation
Journalists and scholars have long classified the Japanese political economy as 
“special” (Prestowitz [1988]; Fallows [1989, 1994]; Vogel [1979]; Johnson [1982,
1987]; Abegglen [1984]; Aoki [1988]). For many years, the Japanese economy
produced high rates of GDP growth coupled with low rates of inflation, as its export-
ing industry churned out competitive products sought after by consumers all over the
world. U.S. business schools celebrated Japan’s unique approach to business, built on
the reputation and trust coming out of long-term relationships between producers
and suppliers, employers and employees. Japanese managers were envied for their
passive shareholders and their long-term attitude toward return on investment.
Admirers of “Asian values” celebrated the political stability made possible by the
dominance of Japan’s “long-lived” elite bureaucracy, the one-party rule of the Liberal
Democratic Party, and the complacency of Japanese voters and consumers.
In the early 1990s, the Japanese model began to crumble. The economy’s rate of
growth dropped sharply, home-loan companies crashed, and the stability of the
Japanese financial system was threatened by bad debts. Japanese firms fired long-term
suppliers and employees in unprecedented numbers. Increasingly, the bureaucracy
lost its power to elected politicians competing in a “real” multi-party system.
Shareholders, voters, and consumers began to assert their interests. 
Accordingly, journalists and scholars are revising their view of Japan. Some move
from one extreme view to another, replacing “Japan as Number One” (Vogel [1979])
with “Japan as—Anything But—Number One” (Woronoff [1991]). Others admit the
possibility that there never was anything special about Japan, arguing that the
Japanese political economy is subject to the same “laws” of economics and political
science that have been successful in accounting for the behavior of producers, con-
sumers, voters, interest groups, politicians, and bureaucrats in modern democracies
(The Economist [1996]; Calder [1988]; Ramseyer and Rosenbluth [1993]; Cowhey
[1993]; Cowhey and McCubbins [1995]; Cox, Rosenbluth, and Thies [1996];
Ramseyer [1996]; McCubbins and Thies [1997]).
This paper contributes to the emerging view of Japan as a “normal” country. 
It addresses the widespread view that Japan is an outlier with regard to its monetary
institutions and inflation performance (Cargill [1995]; Cargill, Hutchison, and 
Ito [1995]).
Empirical studies of central bank independence and inflation have found that
developed countries tend to have independent central banks and low inflation rates,
while developing countries tend to have dependent central banks and high inflation
rates (admitting substantial differences with each group and changes over time within
some countries). For developed countries, measures of legal central bank indepen-
dence have predictive power for inflation; for developing countries, the turnover rates
of central bank governors are good predictors of inflation, while legal arrangements
are more or less irrelevant (Cukierman [1992]; see also Maxfield [1997]).
Against this background, the data suggest that there is indeed something remark-
able about Japan (Table 1). Japan enjoys some of the lowest inflation rates in the
world. At the same time, the Bank of Japan is ranked as one of the least independent
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1
I. Ranking of Central Banks by Inflation, 1980s
2
Japan ranks . . .
. . . 1st (tied with Switzerland, Germany, Malta, the Netherlands, Panama, and Singapore) out of 68
developed and developing countries 
. . . 1st (tied with Switzerland, Germany, and the Netherlands) out of 21 developed countries 
. . . 1st (tied with Malta, Panama, and Singapore) out of 47 developing countries and Japan
II. Ranking of Central Banks by Legal Independence, 1980s
3
Japan ranks . . .
. . . 63rd (tied with Morocco and Panama) out of 68 developed and developing countries 
. . . 20th out of 21 developed countries 
. . . 43rd (tied with Morocco and Panama) out of 47 developing countries and Japan
III. Ranking of Central Banks by Governors’ Turnover Rate, 1950–89
4
Japan ranks . . .
. . . 33rd (tied with Spain, Romania, Colombia, and Thailand) out of 58 developed and developing
countries 
. . . 18th (tied with Spain) out of 19 developed countries 
. . . 16th (tied with Romania, Colombia, and Thailand) out of 39 developing countries and Japan
Notes: 1. Rankings are calculated from tables 19.3, 19.4, and 19.5 in Cukierman (1992). 
2. High rank corresponds to low inflation, low rank to high inflation.
3. High rank corresponds to high degree of independence, low rank to low degree of independence.
4. High rank corresponds to low turnover rate, low rank to high turnover rate.
central banks among developed countries; even when Japan is compared to a group
of developing countries, the legal independence of its central bank ranks low, and the
turnover rate of its central bank governors compares to the turnover rates observed in
many developing countries.
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Japan’s outlier status raises questions about the validity of the causal inferences
drawn from the empirical correlation between various measures of central bank
independence and inflation. Indeed, the Japanese example is occasionally cited in
support of the view that central bank independence is epiphenomenal—that price
stability is guaranteed not by institutions but by powerful political interests that
stand to gain from low inflation (Posen [1993]; see also Henning [1994] and
Maxfield [1997]). The empirical record is also consistent with the opposite view 
that “institutions matter”—but what matters is the way the central banking
institution is embedded in a larger political system, not whether it is independent 
on paper (Lohmann [1995, 1998]). Thus, even if the Bank of Japan is formally
subordinate to the Ministry of Finance, monetary policy will be insulated from the
pressures of electoral and partisan politics to the extent that the Ministry of Finance
is independent. 
This paper develops a model of monetary linkages, with the goal of providing a
unified account of cross-country differences and intra-country changes over time 
in the institutional commitment to price stability. The model sheds light on the
relationship between monetary institutions and price stability in the old Japan and
generates predictions about the prospects for price stability in the new Japan. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Chapter II. presents the time-
consistency problem in monetary policy and the “reputational solution” to thisproblem.
1 Chapter III. discusses the conditions under which the commitment 
to price stability takes on institutionalized form. Chapter IV. develops a model of
monetary linkages, in which the credibility of the government’s commitment to 
price stability depends on its performance on other dimensions of public policy.
Chapter V. argues that monetary institutions serve to establish and maintain linkages
across dimensions of public policy. Chapter VI. applies the model to developed and
developing countries, including the old and new Japan.
II. Reputationand theTime-Consistency ProbleminMonetaryPolicy
This chapter develops a simple model of the time-consistency problem that results 
in a counterproductive inflation bias to discretionary monetary policy (Kydland 
and Prescott [1977]; Barro and Gordon [1983]). There are two “unitary actor” players:
the private sector, which forms inflation expectations pe, and the government, which sets
inflation p. This sequence of events is repeated in each period over an infinite horizon. 
The political party controlling the government has two economic goals, output
stimulation and inflation stabilization. When in power, its one-period utility
function is given by 
p
2
U = p – pe – —. (1)
2
The government party has an infinite time horizon with discount factor DÎ[0, 1].
In each period, it is elected with probability P and becomes the opposition party
with probability (1 – P), PÎ [0, 1].
2 The party does not care about economic welfare
when it is out of power; its utility in periods of opposition is normalized to zero.
3
The first term in the government party’s utility function, p – pe, reflects its desire
to stimulate output growth, which is driven by unanticipated inflation (Fischer,
1977). The wage setters in the private sector target the natural rate of output growth
(normalized to zero) in their nominal wage contracts. They negotiate nominal wage
growth pe before the government sets the inflation rate p. If the actual inflation rate
exceeds its expected value, real wage growth decreases, with positive output effects.
Correspondingly, an inflation rate that lies below its expected value lowers output
growth. The second term in the government party’s utility function, –p
2/2, reflects
its desire to stabilize inflation (the inflation “bliss point” is normalized to zero). 
Once the private sector’s inflation expectations are locked in, the optimal value for
inflation is given by 
pD = 1 (2)
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1. My terminology is consistent with that of the political economy literature, which speaks of reputational solutions
in complete information settings (see, for example, Persson and Tabellini [1990]). Standard game theory has repu-
tational effects arising in the presence of incomplete information (see, for example, Fudenberg and Tirole [1992]).
2. This probability P is exogenously fixed. In a more elaborate model, it could depend on the government’s
economic performance.
3. This assumption is made for simplicity. As a practical matter, it is plausible that a political party cares less strongly
about economic welfare when it is out of power.where the subscript D stands for discretion. Since there is no uncertainty, the private
sector’s rational inflation expectations are equal to the actual inflation rate: 
p e
D = 1. (3)
The government’s utility under the discretionary regime is equal to 
1 U (pD, p e
D) = – —. (4)
2
If the government can credibly commit itself to an inflation rate before nominal
wage growth is locked in, it sets
pC = 0 (5)
where the subscript C stands for commitment. The private sector rationally
anticipates the inflation rate under this regime:
p e
C = 0. (6)
With credible commitment, the government’s utility is equal to 
U (pC, p e
C) = 0. (7)
If the government promises to set zero inflation and the private sector writes zero
inflation expectations into its nominal wage contracts, then the government can
achieve a one-period gain by reneging on its promise—with “surprise” inflation it can
stimulate the economy: 
1 U (pD, p e
C) = —. (8) 2
If the government keeps its promise, it achieves the utility given in equation (7).
Hence, the government’s temptation to renege is equal to 
1 U (pD, p e
C) – U (pC, p e
C) = —. (9) 2
The private sector employs a “grim” trigger-strategy punishment: if the govern-
ment defects, the private sector loses faith in the government’s commitment to price
stability and expects the government to inflate forever after (see equations [2] and
[3]).
4 The government’s punishment is then equal to the discounted value of the
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4. Alternatively, we could assume that a defection triggers a breakdown of the zero inflation regime for a finite
number of periods, after which price stability resumes. The comparative statistics with respect to the length of 
the punishment period correspond to those for the discount factor. That is, an increase in the length of the
punishment period has the same effect as an increase in the discount factor.difference between the utility achieved under price stability (see equation [7]) and the
discretionary regime (see equation [4]):
(DP + D2P2 + D3P3 + . . .) [U (pC, pe
C) – U (pD, pe
D)] = 
DP 1 ——— —.
(10)
1 – DP  2
Price stability is sustainable as an equilibrium outcome if the punishment is
greater than the temptation, that is, if 
U (pD, pe
C) – U (pC, pe
C) ≤
(DP + D2P2 + D3P3 + . . .) [U (pC, pe
C) – U (pD, pe
D)] (11)
1         DP     1                     1 Û   — £ ——— — —   Û DP³ —.
2      1 – DP  2                     2
The commitment to zero inflation is credible if the government’s time discount
factor is sufficiently high and the reelection prospects of the party controlling the
government are sufficiently favorable. Defining the political discount factor d º DP
as a composite of the “true” time discount factor D and the government party’s
election probability P, equation (11) implies that price stability is sustainable as an
equilibrium outcome for the set of political discount factors dÎ[0.5, 1].
III. Institutional Solutions to the Time-Consistency Problem
Well-designed monetary institutions may alleviate the time-consistency problem in
monetary policy. For the purposes of this paper, an institution is defined as an
arrangement that constrains the conduct of monetary policy.
5 Examples are monetary
targeting procedures, especially x-percent monetary growth rules (Friedman [1968];
Canzoneri [1985]); delegation to a conservative central banker (Rogoff [1985];
Lohmann [1992]); constitutionally guaranteed central bank independence
(Neumann [1991]); fixed exchange rate regimes (Giavazzi and Pagano [1988]; Mélitz
[1988]; Cukierman [1992]); the gold standard (Bordo and Kydland [1993]); and
incentive contracts for central bankers (Walsh [1995]). 
It is often argued that monetary institutions “create” credible commitment
(Lohmann [1995]). However, even though institutions may further the prospects for price
stability, they are not generally necessary or sufficient for credible commitment. 
The integrity of an institution must be protected by reputational means. Suppose a
government commits itself to respect the constraints on monetary policy that are
implied by a monetary institution. In any one period, the government is tempted to
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5. Consistent with this definition, a central bank that makes purely “technocratic” decisions about monetary policy
would not be classified as a monetary institution. defect and ignore these constraints. The “audience” of its commitment—wage setters,
financial markets, voters, and the like—might punish such an institutional defection by
disbelieving the government’s institutional promises in the future. That is, the govern-
ment loses the future benefits that come with the institutionalized commitment to price
stability. The credibility of the government’s commitment is then a function of its
political discount factor, which determines the relative importance of the one-shot
temptation to defect and the discounted future punishment. 
If monetary institutions cannot create credible commitment in the absence of
reputational enforcement, they may nonetheless strengthen the commitment to price
stability. First, institutions may coordinate people’s beliefs about trigger-strategy
punishments, thereby selecting a Pareto-preferred equilibrium out of a multiplicity of
possible equilibria. Second, in the presence of imperfect or incomplete information,
institutions may improve the monitoring ability of the audience whose equilibrium
prescription it is to punish defections (Lohmann [1995]).
Clearly, a government that cares little about the future cannot achieve price
stability, whether by reputational or institutional means. However, a government
whose political discount factor is sufficiently high has a choice. To achieve price
stability, it can live with the non-institutionalized reputational mechanisms (if any)
that wage setters, financial markets, or voters happen to coordinate on, or it can
commit itself to a monetary institution. A well-designed institution that enjoys
credibility because it is backed up by reputational trigger-strategy punishments 
may improve upon the economic outcomes obtained under non-institutionalized
reputational mechanisms. 
For example, in the absence of institutional constraints, suppose that the govern-
ment loses popularity among voters, with negative consequences for its reelection
prospects, if it inflates. This mechanism makes inflation politically costly and thus
has the potential to reduce inflation. It also has a downside. The voters’ trigger-
strategy punishments are “too crude”: legitimate inflationary responses are not
excused, perhaps because the voters lack information about when inflation is
legitimate. (Inflation may further economic welfare when extreme real shocks or
unforeseen contingencies are realized.) Moreover, inflationary surges can be caused by
factors the government does not control, such as extreme money demand shocks. 
To avoid triggering the voters’ wrath, the government has incentives to respond 
“too conservatively” to real shocks and unforeseen contingencies.
For an example of a monetary institution that is backed up by reputational
trigger-strategy punishments, consider the European Monetary System (EMS). 
A stylized view of the EMS interprets the deutsche mark as the anchor currency of
the system. Other member states of the EMS are in effect committed to set their
inflation rate equal to the German inflation rate. Just as a country can join the EMS
by political fiat, it can “defect” on its institutional commitment by devaluing its
currency or exiting from the EMS. Such a defection is punished by a loss in
popularity: because devaluations and exits are front-page news, voters can monitor
their governments’ commitment to the EMS at low cost.
However, even though voters follow the simple strategy of punishing their govern-
ments for breaking the EMS commitment, monetary policy may nonetheless respond
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Bundesbank is the perfect central banker—following a course of price stability while
responding optimally to a variety of real shocks and unforeseen contingencies, which
are common to the member states of the EMS. In this case, the EMS is the ideal
solution to the time-consistency problem in monetary policy: by linking the value of
its currency to the deutsche mark, a country gains price stability without sacrificing
flexibility. Moreover, since the EMS (in this idealized description) is the perfect
monetary institution, the need to defect never arises, and the voters never execute
their trigger-strategy punishments.
In practice, of course, the EMS comes at a price. German monetary policy is
responsive to a variety of domestic concerns. To the extent that German shocks are
not perfectly correlated with the shocks impinging on the economies of other EMS
member states, those countries not only forgo the benefits arising from the stabiliza-
tion role of monetary policy, but they also “import” monetary variability generated
by the Bundesbank’s domestic responsiveness. In the early 1990s, for example, the
non-German EMS states suffered recessionary consequences when German monetary
policy was geared toward dealing with the potentially inflationary consequences of
German unification. Because the Bundesbank is not a perfect central banker, the
non-German members of the EMS occasionally find it worthwhile to devalue their
currency vis-à-vis the deutsche mark or to exit the EMS, in which case they incur the
reputational cost triggered by such an “institutional defection.” 
For another example of an institutionalized commitment to price stability,
consider the monetary targets publicly announced by the Bundesbank since 1974.
The Bundesbank initially committed itself to point targets for the monetary growth
rate; starting in the late 1970s, it switched to 2 and 3 percent ranges. Either way, 
the Bundesbank’s targets have been very simple. Prohibitive transaction costs and
limited foresight arguably prevent the Bundesbank from announcing monetary
targets that are conditional on a variety of shocks and unforeseen contingencies. 
The Bundesbank’s announcement is directed at trade union and employer peak
organizations and financial markets; its audience consists of Bundesbank watchers
whose inflation expectations shape a large number of nominal prices. The German
public is not part of this audience: the huge majority of German people do not know
the pre-announced value of the monetary target, and even if they did, they would
face a prohibitive cost of monitoring whether the Bundesbank was fulfilling its target.
Indeed, most Germans are blissfully unaware of the fact that the Bundesbank is
committed to following a monetary target at all. It follows that the cost of an 
unexcused defection from the target consists primarily of the increase in future
inflation expectations formed by Bundesbank watchers. 
Interestingly, the Bundesbank has failed to fulfill its monetary targets about half
the time, but in each case it has “explained” the reasons for its lack of success in great
detail to the elite community that monitors its performance. This audience is capable
of assessing whether the Bundesbank’s excuses are acceptable, thereby allowing for
“excused defection.” According to this interpretation, the Bundesbank’s monetary
targeting regime de facto implements a monetary growth rule that is contingent on
shocks and unforeseen circumstances. This theory is consistent with the observation
70 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/DECEMBER 1997that the Bundesbank’s inflation-fighting reputation has not suffered as a consequence
of the apparently dismal performance of its monetary targeting regime. On the
contrary, if anything, its reputation has become stronger in the last two decades.
At first blush, non-institutionalized reputational mechanisms and institutional
mechanisms that are backed up by reputational trigger-strategy punishments look
very similar: either the government is punished for inflating or it is punished for
failing to respect the constraints implied by a disinflationary monetary institution.
However, different reputational and institutional solutions address different audi-
ences and invoke different beliefs about trigger-strategy punishments. As a result,
reputational and institutions solutions differ with regard to the average rate of
inflation, the degree to which monetary policy responds flexibly to shocks and
unforeseen contingencies, and the probability that defections occur in equilibrium
and trigger the punishment (price stability breaks down, the government suffers a
loss in popularity, and the like).
IV. Monetary Linkages
So far we have analyzed the case of two “unitary actors,” the private sector and the
government, playing a monetary policy game. In this chapter, we first consider 
the possibility that these two players interact with each other on more than one
dimension of public policy. Specifically, we assume that they play two games, a
monetary policy game and a regulatory policy game. Both games are subject to a
time-consistency problem: in the monetary policy game, the commitment to price
stability is at stake, in the regulatory policy game, the commitment to stable regula-
tory standards. In this setting, issue linkage allows for the linkage of trigger-strategy
punishments across dimensions of public policy (Lohmann [1997]; see also
Bernheim and Whinston [1986]; McGinnis [1986]; and Lohmann [1993]). A
defection in the monetary policy game or the regulatory policy game leads to an
erosion of private-sector trust in both price stability and regulatory stability. Because
the punishment looms larger under issue linkage, commitment obtains for a larger
range of discount factors. 
We then consider the possibility that the private sector and the government are
not unitary actors but consist of multiple actors. Specifically, we assume that the
private sector is composed of two actors: the wage setters, who interact with 
the government over monetary policy, and a firm that is subject to government
regulation. (We also consider the possibility that the government consists of multiple
actors.) In this setting, player linkage allows for the linkage of trigger-strategy punish-
ments across games played by different players (Lohmann [1997]; see also Bendor
and Mookherjee [1990]; Milgrom, North, and Weingast [1990]; Kandori [1992];
and Lohmann [1993]). If the government defects vis-à-vis the wage setters in the
monetary policy game or vis-à-vis the firm in the regulatory policy game, then the
commitment to both price stability and regulatory stability breaks down. The players
who, in the aggregate, form the private sector punish the government for defecting in
any game independently of whether they themselves are active participants in the
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and commitment obtains for a larger range of discount factors.
We now turn to the description of the time-consistency problem in regulatory
policy (Baron [1988, 1993]). Anticipating that the government will impose stringent
regulatory standards in the future, the firm expects the resulting compliance costs to
decrease its profits. As a result, the firm invests less, with negative consequences 
for employment and output. In this setting, the commitment to stable regulatory
standards has value because it shapes the firm’s expectations about future regulatory
policy and thus affects its investment decision. 
The government’s one-period utility function over regulatory policy is given by
r 2
V = r – r e – — (12)
2
where r is the stringency of the regulatory standard and r e the expected stringency of
the standard. The first term, r, stands for the benefits of regulation. For example, the
regulatory standard might affect the health and safety of the firm’s workers. The
second term, –r e, stands for the loss in employment and output that obtains when
the firm invests less anticipating future regulation; and the third term, –r
2/2, stands
for the compliance costs of regulation. In each period, the firm forms rational expec-
tations about the regulatory standard, r e, and the government sets the regulatory
standard, r. This sequence of events is repeated indefinitely. The time-consistency
problems in regulatory policy and monetary policy thus have the same formal
structure (compare equations [1] and [12]). 
If the government sets regulatory policy at its discretion, we obtain 
rD = r e
D = 1,  (13)
1 V(rD, r e
D) = – —. (14)
2
If the government can credibly commit itself to a regulatory standard before the
firm forms its expectations and locks in its investment, we obtain
rC = r e
C = 0, (15)
V(rC, r e
C) = 0. (16)
The utility level achieved by reneging on the commitment to stable regulatory
standards is equal to
1 V(rD, r e
C) = —. (17)
2
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1 V(rD, r e
C) – V(rC, r e
C) = —. (18) 2
The punishment is the discounted value of the difference between the utility
achieved under the regime of credible commitment (see equation [16]) and the
discretionary regime (see equation [14]):
d 1 (d + d
2 + d
3 + . . . )[V(rC, r e
C) – V(rD, r e
D)] = —— — —. (19)
1 – d 2
Credible commitment is feasible if the punishment dominates the temptation 
to defect: 
d V(rD, r e
C) – V(rC, r e
C) ≤ —— — [V(rC, r e
C) – V(rD, r e
D)] 
1 – d
1        d 1                  1 Û — £ —— — —   Ûd  ³ —
(20)
2     1 – d  2                  2
that is, for the set of political discount factors dÎ[0.5, 1].
So far, we have analyzed the situation in which the regulatory policy game is
delinked from the monetary policy game. That is, if the government defects in one
game, the credibility of its commitment in the other game remains unaffected.
Now we examine the implications of issue linkage. Without loss of generality, let
us assume that in each period the government sets monetary policy first, regulatory
policy second. If the government defects in one game, its credibility breaks down in
both games.
The one-period gains from defection are the same as before. However, the punish-
ment is higher under issue linkage. If the government defects in the monetary policy
game, it loses the benefits of commitment in the regulatory policy game that is
played concurrently as well as the benefits of commitment in the monetary policy
games and regulatory policy games played in all future periods. The incentive
constraint defining the feasibility of credible commitment in monetary policy is
given by 
U(pD, pe
C) – U(pC, pe
C) ≤ V(rC, r e
C) – V(rD, r e
D) + 
d[U(pC, pe
C) – U(pD, pe
D)] + d[V(rC, r e




C) – U(pD, pe
D)] + d
2[V(rC, r e
C) – V(rD, r e
D)] + . . .  (21)
1      1        d      1      1 Û — £ — + —— — (— + —) Ûd  ³ 0.
2      2     1 – d 2      2
If the government defects in the regulatory policy game, it loses the benefits of
commitment in the monetary policy games and regulatory policy games played in all
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ment in regulatory policy is given by
V(rD, r e
C) – V(rC, r e
C) ≤
d[U(pC, pe
C) – U(pD, pe
D)] + d[V(rC, r e




C) – U(pD, pe
D)] + d
2[V(rC, r e
C) – V(rD, r e
D)] + . . .  (22)
1      d      1      1                   1 Û — £ —— — (— + —) Ûd  ³ —.
2     1 – d 2      2                   3
When the trigger-strategy punishments in the two games are linked, price stability
and regulatory stability are feasible only if the incentive constraints for both games
are met. The game with the stronger incentives to defect dominates; that is, equation
(22) defines the feasibility of credible commitment under issue linkage. Thus, the
range of political discount factors for which the government can lock in the commit-
ment to price stability and regulatory stability is given by dÎ[0.33, 1]. Issue linkage
enlarges the set of discount factors for which price stability and regulatory stability
are sustainable as an equilibrium outcome, from dÎ[0.5, 1] to dÎ[0.33, 1]. 
As we add more issue dimensions, credible commitment is feasible for an increas-
ingly large set of political discount factors. Suppose that in addition to monetary
policy there are k – 1 regulatory issues that are decided sequentially and repeatedly: 
in each period, monetary policy is set first, followed by regulatory issue number 1,
regulatory issue number 2, and so on, until regulatory issue number k – 1 is decided
last; this sequence of events is repeated indefinitely. The government’s utility function
on each regulatory issue takes the form of equation (12). 
The government has the strongest incentives to defect on issue k – 1, since 
this issue is decided last in a given period. The incentive constraint for this issue
determines the feasibility of a credible commitment in monetary policy and all k – 1
dimensions of regulatory policy: 
V(rD, r e
C) – V(rC, r e
C) ≤
d[U(pC, pe
C) – U(pD, pe
D)] + d(k – 1) [V(rC, r e




C) – U(pD, pe
D)] + d
2(k – 1) [V(rC, r e
C) – V(rD, r e
D)] + . . .  (23)
1      d      1      1 Û — £ —— — k—   Ûd  ³ ——.
2     1 – d 2      k + 1
As the number of issues, k, increases, price stability and regulatory stability are
feasible for an increasingly large set of political discount factors, dÎ[1/(k + 1), 1]. 
Next, we consider the implications of player linkage. In this setting, the players’
trigger-strategy punishments are linked across games even though each player is an
active participant only in a subset of games. Suppose the private sector consists of
wage setters, who interact with the government over monetary policy, and a firm,
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policy game or the regulatory policy game, then the wage setters lose faith in price
stability and the regulated firm loses faith in regulatory stability. The incentive con-
straint for the feasibility of credibility commitment in equation (22) applies here:
under player linkage, credible commitment is feasible for the set of political discount
factors dÎ[0.33, 1]. 
Alternatively, the private sector might consist of wage setters and k – 1 firms sub-
ject to different kinds of regulation. Here, the unitary actor government interacts
with k players in k separate games. The incentive constraint in equation (23) applies:
under player linkage, price stability and regulatory stability are feasible for the set of
political discount factors dÎ[1/(k + 1), 1]. 
In a more complex game, multiple government actors play games on multiple
issues with multiple private-sector actors and with each other. For example, the
central bank, which sets inflation, plays the monetary policy game with the wage
setters, and a regulatory agency, which has authority to set all kinds of regulatory
standards, plays multiple regulatory policy games with private firms, among them
private banks. The two government actors each face a time-consistency vis-à-vis a
subset of the private sector, but they must also find a way to cooperate with each
other over (for example) banking regulations that may have monetary policy conse-
quences. Under issue and player linkage, if the central bank defects in the monetary
policy game or fails to cooperate with the regulatory agency, it loses credibility both
with wage setters and the regulatory agency; correspondingly, if the regulatory agency
defects in the regulatory policy game or fails to cooperate with the central bank, 
it loses credibility both with regulated firms and the central bank. Clearly, as the
number of issues and players increases, credible commitment is feasible for an
increasingly large set of political discount factors. 
Democratically elected politicians have short time-horizons because they fear
losing power to the opposition. For this reason, they have a problem with credible
commitment. However, modern democracies are complex societies dealing with 
a large number of issues: monetary policy, regulatory policy, trade policy,
agricultural policy, environmental policy, and the like. Large numbers of players
interact with each other: producers, consumers, interest groups, voters, political
parties, legislators, courts, different levels of government, agencies, commissions,
and so on. In such societies, complex issue and player linkages pave the way for
credible commitment. 
V. Institutional Webs
Linkage may further cooperation by establishing or maintaining beliefs that defec-
tions in one game will trigger a breakdown of cooperation in other games. So far, this
idea has been developed in a setting with “reputational” play that did not assign an
explicit role to institutions. This chapter argues that “institutional webs” (Portnoy
[1995]; see also Lohmann [1995, 1997]; Bendor and Mookherjee [1987]) are the
vehicle by which linkages are established and maintained. 
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beliefs on a Pareto-preferred equilibrium. This function of institutions is all the more
important because linkage is a fragile thing—it comes about only because of the
players’ beliefs that cooperative behavior in one setting influences the prospects for
cooperation in other, possibly functionally unrelated, settings. 
To illustrate the role of institutions in linking trigger-strategy punishments across
games, consider a government seeking to achieve price stability by granting indepen-
dence to its central bank. It can do so in one of three ways: the government can
publicly announce that it will not meddle with the central bank in the future; it can
pass a simple law declaring the central bank legally independent; or it can pass a
constitutional amendment protecting the independence of the central bank.
A public announcement, which can be revoked by political fiat, is less credible
than a simple law, which implies some degree of legal commitment; and a simple law
is less credible than a constitutional amendment because the former can be revoked
with a simple majority in parliament, whereas the latter requires a super-majority. 
The credibility of a legal commitment to central bank independence does not rely
on legal sanctions. It is unheard of for elected politicians to go to prison for dis-
missing their central bank governors or for pressuring the central bank by other
means. Instead, legal commitments are credible because of issue and player linkages.
If a government passes a law and then breaks the law or revokes it for opportunistic
reasons, it pays a price: there is an erosion of trust in the credibility of legal commit-
ments of similar standing. The commitment implied by a constitutional amendment
is greater than the commitment implied by a simple law because the political cost of
defying a constitutional amendment is greater than the political cost of defying a
simple law: these two forms of legal commitment are supported by different linkages
or, equivalently, they invoke different trigger-strategy punishments. 
Earlier, we noted a second function of institutions. In games involving third-party
enforcement, it obviously makes a difference whether the third party can observe, or is
informed about, defections. When defections are partially or fully hidden from the
relevant audience, institutions that provide information about defections affect the
play of the game and its payoffs. As the issue and player linkages in a society become
increasingly complex, informational problems are compounded: it becomes increas-
ingly difficult for players who are not active participants in a game to observe a defec-
tion or to evaluate whether a defection occurred. This is where institutions come in. 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionality is an example of a monetary
institution that furthers credible commitment by providing information enabling
players to punish defectors. The IMF provides technical and financial assistance to
developing countries conditional on agreement by recipient countries to follow
through with inflation stabilization programs. IMF evaluations are a critical element
in a country’s debt restructuring and refinancing efforts. The country accepts the
conditions imposed by the IMF because they serve as a “seal of approval” assuring
private banks in foreign countries that the country in question is an acceptable credit
risk (Edwards [1989]). 
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The theory developed here yields the following implications. Whether a country
achieves price stability depends on the political discount factor d. For very low d, the
government cannot credibly commit itself to price stability, nor can it credibly
commit itself to respect the constraints imposed by a disinflationary institution.
Neither reputational nor institutional solutions to the time-consistency problem
work. The country suffers under inflation, and institutions “do not matter.”
Politically unstable developing countries might be classified in this way (low P).
6
If the political discount factor d is very high, the government can commit itself 
to price stability directly or indirectly—by non-institutionalized reputational means
or by setting up a monetary institution. Here, price stability is feasible, but once
again institutions are irrelevant. The old Japan, with its powerful bureaucracy and
single-party rule, might be classified in this way (high P). 
Most democracies lie between these two extremes: they are politically stable by
some measures (a low incidence of riots and military coups) and unstable by other
measures (high government turnover rates). For these countries, promises of price
stability are not credible if such promises are made in isolation from other dimen-
sions of public policy. But with issue and player linkages, credible commitment is
feasible. Such linkages are established and maintained by monetary institutions. The
institutional means by which price stability can be achieved differ across countries;
examples given earlier included the Bundesbank’s monetary targeting regimes, 
the EMS, legal central bank independence, and IMF conditionality. Different
institutional choices reflect different trade-offs between price stability and other 
goals of monetary policy, as well as country-specific constraints. As a result, the
degree to which price stability is achieved differs across countries. We would expect 
inflation to vary at low levels as a function of institutions. The new Japan, in which
elected politicians are competing with each other in the political marketplace and
asserting their dominance vis-à-vis the bureaucracy, might be classified in this way
(intermediate P).
In summary, this paper predicts that the new Japan will continue on its path of
price stability—but it also suggests that price stability must be achieved by institu-
tional means. For this reason, the ongoing efforts to “regularize” Japanese monetary
institutions and bring them in line with the institutions of other highly developed,
politically mature democracies are promising indeed. 
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